Introduction
2 movement or pro-democratic coalition, these complex movements briefly contained within their ranks disparate, contradictory and even competing interests that made temporary common cause but which often found that the apparent successful achievement of their immediate aim did not lead to the underlying changes in politics, economy or society they had sought.
Much of this complexity has commonly been lost in histories of African political change.
These have sometimes dismissed popular activism as largely irrelevant to processes of elitedriven change, or idealised it in ways that tend to remove its particularity and explore it only in relation to the broader political movement of which it formed a part. More radical elements of nationalist movements were dismissed as harbouring 'unrealistic expectations' of self-rule, whilst the pro-democracy movements of the early 1990s evolved into narrow projects for economic and political liberalisation, for reasons which are explored below. Between these two milestones, day-to-day socio-economic and cultural protests received little attention by researchers generally focused on more structural or ideological notions of political change.
By refocusing on activism as process rather than as outcome, we may recapture aspects of African activism that not only provide insight into the relationship between popular and elite political organisation and ideas, but also enable instructive comparison between periods of heightened activism both within Africa and between Africa and the wider world.
The romantic and often ideologically constructed search for 'authentic' African subaltern voices has, like the nationalist historiography that preceded it, often distorted the messy contradictory realities of African associational life. 1 This article starts from the assumption that there is no straightforward relationship between specific examples of popular mass-based activism and a self-evident 'will of the people'. Indeed, one of the important themes of this 3 article is the interaction between local activist initiatives and dominant discourses of political change primarily arising from and constructed in western societies. During the twentieth century, African political and social activists periodically utilised, and debated the extent to which, originally western political and moral meta-narratives (for example, Christianity, socialism, democracy, neo-liberalism, human rights etc.) provided a meaningful framework for their local activism. Although Africans have appropriated, rethought and reworked such concepts, utilising them in their own interests and in hybrid forms relevant to their specific context, a tension nevertheless often arises between such globalised notions of political change and the particular way in which they are conceived of, articulated and utilised in Africa -a tension which remains under-analysed.
Placing activism at the centre of the historical analysis of recent African history offers both considerable potential, but equally presents considerable methodological and historiographical problems. Local protest movements, particular in rural areas, often went undocumented except for brief reports in local newspapers; recapturing the motives and worldview of activists and separating them from the meta-narratives that were imposed, contemporaneously or retrospectively, on their actions, is in some cases a virtually impossible task. Distinguishing essentially reactive protests on the one hand, from longer-term activist initiatives that become visible to external observers only during periods of protest, is an important but challenging task. This article, in providing an overview of activism in latecolonial and post-colonial Africa, necessarily provides few specific insights in this regard.
Rather, it has the more modest aim of providing a meaningful periodisation of activism in the twentieth century and early twenty-first century and, in exploring some of the issues that arise, to provide a stimulus for future research in this area.
Political activism in Africa in the early colonial period
The study of political activism in the twentieth century generally suffered from the imposition of externally constructed and often abstract frameworks onto localised movements, which were then criticised for not failing to reflect these frameworks. Africanist historians of the 1960s, for example, in seeking to explain the absence of united 'primary'
resistance to the imposition of colonial rule, assumed shared interests amongst African societies that had in fact no intrinsic cultural commonality and had indeed often been in conflict with each other. 2 African societies, enormously diverse in their size, material development, mode of governance and socio-cultural perspectives, reacted in various ways to the initial imposition of colonial rule and, most immediately, its particular manifestations. which may apply to an ignorant or backward mass'. 8 As their inability to negotiate such reforms became increasingly evident, middle-class Africans recognised the need to make common cause with the wider indigenous population in broader nationalist coalitions unifying diverse interests-but this did not mean that the divisions, socio-economic and cultural, that existed within African societies were any less significant.
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The high point of popular activism in recent African history is that associated with the anti- Nationalist leaders skilfully drew on popular grievances (economic, but also cultural) and sought to associate their alleviation with the achievement of national independence. In so doing, they consciously replicated the experiences and practices of non-African nationalists who successfully linked local socio-economic and cultural concerns and protests to their demand for national self-determination. Mahatma Gandhi provided an inspiration to many African nationalists, but so too did European pioneers such as Giuseppe Mazzini. Such initiatives sought but commonly failed to mask their own regional or sub-national particularities, and were themselves frequently challenged by competing sub-nationalisms within the territories to which they laid claim.
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Activism and Nationalism
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Labour unions were amongst the most significant activist institutions upon which nationalists drew. Despite their small membership (reflecting limited industrialisation), trade unions proved in the late-colonial period to be particularly disruptive to colonial economies dependent on the production, transportation and export of minerals and other raw goods.
Workers' use of strike action to extract higher wages and improved conditions led nationalist politicians to seek to utilise industrial unrest to bring about their political demands. This however brought political parties into conflict with union leaders, many of whom were sceptical that a linear focus on the achievement of self-government was the best way of addressing their members' material grievances.
Labour activism was initially decidedly informal and often illegal. The wartime period witnessed significant unrest, arising from the rising cost of living, amongst African workers who were generally legally barred from forming trade unions. In 1945 a general strike that paralysed Nigeria was followed in quick succession by strike action in the mines and transport services of various colonies. In the late 1940s, French and British colonial officials accepted the need for legal trade unions, but sought to ensure they would be respectable and 'non-political'. The evident effectiveness of labour unrest highlighted its potential for providing support for broader anti-colonial movements. There was however strong resistance by many union leaders to fully fledged alliances with nationalist organisations. In 1953 for example, the Northern Rhodesian African Mineworkers' Union refused to endorse a two-day protest by the African National Congress. 12 The resultant tension and mutual suspicion raised questions regarding the dual identities of Africans as members of a new organised workingclass, and as potential subjects of independent nations. 13 Meanwhile, individual unionists emerged as prominent nationalist leaders and, subsequently, political leaders of soon-to-be independent states. 14 Nationalist alliances with labour movements increasingly focussed not 8 on industrial action to win political change, but on the prevention of strikes to smooth the path to independence. Now in the position of managing fledgling states with highly peripheral capitalist economies, they discouraged industrial action in the interests of 'national
Meanwhile, what Low and Lonsdale termed the "second colonial occupation" led to an increased interventionism by colonial states in the lives of their subjects. 15 Attempts to boost agricultural development prompted resistance, for example in Tanganyika, by local African improvement associations and cooperative farming bodies, often in opposition to chiefly authorities. 16 Efforts made by colonial authorities to 'improve' African agriculture were into a mass party. 20 In so doing, they sought to widen the political equality that TANU demanded to include gender equality. In general however, women did not attain nationalist leadership positions, except in women's leagues or unions.
Much of the richness, heterogeneity and ambiguity of anti-colonial activism was neglected or disregarded by early historians of African nationalism, who regarded such diverse local expressions of discontent as relevant only insofar as they contributed to the transition to independent rule. Idealistic observers tended to uncritically confirm nationalist leaders'
assertions that African societies were essentially classless or homogeneous and that 'sectional' differences, supposedly the result of unwelcome western or capitalist influences, would (and should) be overcome by state-led developmentalism and modernisation. Realist observers regarded the more radical demands of activists as 'unrealistic expectations' that would, in the natural course of events, be tempered or suppressed by post-colonial states.
More germane to historical analysis is the fact that such demands, which had fuelled the participation of activists in nationalist struggles, continued to inform the relation between popular activism and nationalist parties after the transition to independence.
Activism after Independence
The initial post-colonial period, from the early 1960s until around the mid-to-late 1970s, saw the emergence of a post-independence state dominated in most cases by a centralised ruling party, which tended to view the autonomous social movements which had played an important role in mobilising anti-colonial discontent as a threat to or distraction from the central project of national-developmentalism. In this phase, activist articulation of "sectional" grievances or aspirations was negatively counterposed by nationalist rulers to the monopoly they claimed over the articulation of "national" interests. The leaders of newly independent African states continued to utilise the rhetoric of opposition activism, sometimes directed against links between foreign 'neo-colonialism' and internal critics who were dubbed an 'enemy within'. Developmental self-initiative was stifled by state control over rural initiatives such as cooperatives. Independent worker and peasant unions were similarly repressed and/or incorporated into party-state structures, undermining their capacity for representation. Organisational incorporation did not, however, equate to the effective incorporation of workers or peasants themselves. 21 Activists retained a diversity of interpretations of "liberation", "freedom" or "independence", and periodically sought to operationalise their ideas in ways that brought them into conflict with post-colonial states.
Generally, however, this was a period in which ruling parties were able to restrict or suppress autonomous expressions of activism, using the repressive structures of the states they had inherited from colonial regimes. Economic growth did not generally lead to sustainable development, but was initially sufficient to provide Africa's new independent rulers with significant patrimonial capacity, with which they could buy off some of their most vocal and organised critics. Although post-colonial governments expressed rhetorical commitments both to gender equality and to overcoming the poverty of women, they generally perpetuated maternal and feminine stereotypes, suppressing independent women's organisations in favour of official Women's Leagues of ruling parties. Few women MPs were elected, and female ministerial representation was generally limited to tokenistic areas such as Social Welfare.
For example, shortly after Tanganyikan independence in 1963, President Nyerere banned all independent women's organisations, establishing a single national women's organisation,
Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanganyika (UWT). Although Bibi Titi Mohammed initially led
the UWT, she was marginalised in favour of younger, more educated women with the capacity to manage administrative and financial organisation, something that happened to many grassroots local leaders after independence. Whereas the Women's Section had sought to mobilise women politically, the UWT emphasised the technical improvement of women's lives from above, without their participation. 22 In Tanganikya as elsewhere, the vast majority of women lacked effective political representation; for many, the achievement of independence made little difference in their lives.
Although the established churches did not initially criticise the authoritarian actions of newly independent states, more independent churches continued to offer a biblically-informed critique of the political system. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Kitawala church expressed dissatisfaction with the slow pace of economic and social change just two years after independence, utilising a combination of radical nationalism and millenarian discourse:
'Before independence we dreamed that it would bring us masses of marvellous things. All of that was to descend from the sky…Deliverance and Salvation…But here it is, more than two years we have been waiting, and nothing has come. On the contrary our life is more difficult, we are more poor than before'. 23 The Kitawala movement led an uprising that briefly seized Kisangani in 1964; Kitawala youth gangs massacred intellectuals before the movement was itself violently suppressed.
As in other authoritarian systems, newly independent African states sought to shore up their fragile hegemony via the curtailment of non-state associational activity. Refusal to participate More generally however, social movements were forcibly incorporated into state and ruling party structures after independence. This reflected the widespread nationalist position that the supposed lack of class differentiation within African societies made such independent associational life either unnecessary, or a luxury that developing countries could not afford. 24 Thus, former trade union leader and Guinean president Sekou Touré insisted there was no 'plurality' of interests in African society. Internal dissent, when it did occur, could therefore be blamed on foreign or neo-colonial influence.
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African leaders also argued that the developmental concerns of the rural poor had to come before those of relatively privileged urban workers. Post-colonial leaders often replicated colonial anxiety regarding the relatively small number of organised urban workers; they had as the rewards of the independence for which they had fought. 26 In many other countries, however, this incorporation was largely successful, and there was a substantial downturn in industrial action.
Newly independent states inherited the developmental framework of late colonialism, but were as unsure as their predecessors how best to achieve growth. Rural development schemes Marketing Boards provided some support to small farmers, but also monopolised the distribution and sale of particular crops at controlled prices. 27 In many countries, the price paid to farmers for their produce was tightly controlled, as new states sought to generate income for themselves or to provide cheap subsidised food for growing urban populations.
Moore and Vaughan, in describing Zambia, summarise a more general situation across the continent: 'By the 1970s, government interventions ..., which had previously been justified as encouraging 'grass roots' political participation as well as raising rural incomes, looked more like strategies for the containment and control of peasant political activity'. 28 Some farmers rebelled against such controls by smuggling their produce abroad, to sell at market prices elsewhere.
Many leftist regimes sought to establish some form of collective or state farm structure:
ostensibly designed to promote a degree of rural equality and improve access to services, this tended to be disastrous and led to abuses of human rights. James Scott depicts the disastrous impact of Ujamaa policies in late-1970s Tanzania, as state officials imposed collective villagization informed by top-down modernisation models of development with as much authoritarianism as in the colonial era. 29 In southern Africa meanwhile, nationalist movements that in the same period utilised guerrilla-based forms of resistance to settler colonial regimes, stressed their symbiotic relationship with rural Africans. Sympathetic observers saw these as popular movements which depended on their ability to move amongst the civilian population 'like fish in water'. 30 Later analysts have however stressed the extent to which such support rested on the use of terror by guerrilla movements against rural populations, and the extent to which such repressive methods of national liberation (arguably necessitated by the violence of settler regimes themselves) laid the ground for authoritarian post-colonial regimes in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola. 31 Bowen's work on Mozambique equally demonstrates how peasants, despite playing an important role in the struggle against Portuguese colonialism in the early 1970s, were later treated in ways that completely undermined their support for the nationalist-movement-turned-ruling-party, Frelimo, whose '...agricultural strategy completely negated what independence meant to the peasantry'. 32 Peasants were not passive in the face of such problems, but their resistance was often individualised and "hidden". Peasants used the "weapons of the weak", refusing to obey instructions supposedly designed to improve their agricultural practice, as they had done under colonialism. They deserted collective farms and returned to their home areas. Tunisian riots were organised not by incorporated unions or other structures which had been incorporated into the corporatist state, but locally by young women and the unemployed. In both countries, these protests forced their respective presidents to re-establish food subsidies, angering donors but assuaging public opinion. Supposedly hegemonic ruling parties had their weaknesses revealed both by their inability to control unrest, and by their reversal of policy. 34 Such one-off protests by urban masses had the potential to feed into more sustained forms of activism, but also raised the spectre of disorder that could be used by authoritarian states as an excuse for more sustained repression of activist networks.
Although ruling parties often sought to retain state controls over the economy, the dependency on international donors meant that this could not be sustained. Structural adjustment (and later forms of economic liberalisation), whilst certainly unpopular, had an unintentionally positive impact for social movement activists. By exposing the inability of most regimes to prevent popular unrest, and in particular demonstrating the potential for such unrest to overturn unpopular policies, it encouraged dissidents of various kinds to more openly criticise the one-party states.
Towards the later 1980s, such 'spontaneous' protests, directed predominantly against neoliberal economic reforms and austerity measures, contained elements of a critique of regime legitimacy and deployed notions of social justice. Such movements took on aspects of the character of a political opposition, challenging policies and changing the prevailing political configuration. There was however a lack of a coherent unifying political discourse or narrative available to African activists that could generalise specific struggles into a more coherent political movement. They were generally influenced by an unpredictable combination of ideological and religious moral ideas (for example, Catholic social teaching), filtered through and combined with more localised notions of (in)justice.
Activism and the dual transition in the early 1990s
The wave of pro-democracy movements which swept across Africa in the early 1990s is Malawi. In a situation where many groups had lost their capacity for autonomous expression, churches linked to international denominations were able to draw on global support and on widespread acceptance of the legitimacy of biblical teaching to resist such pressures.
These pro-democracy movements were in many respects similar to the nationalist movements that had achieved independence from the colonial powers. They came together quickly from a range of social forces, sought unity around a single common goal and in many cases, rapidly evolved from single-issue movements into opposition political parties. Within such multiparty movements, for example in Zambia, trade unionists who had fought against structural adjustment found common cause with business people who hoped multi-partyism would lead to further economic liberalisation. Social and economic problems could all be blamed on the incumbent ruling party, the removal of which would thereby enable those problems to be overcome. As with nationalist movements, this temporary unity undoubtedly smoothed the path to new multi-party democracies-and as with nationalism, it created unforeseen difficulties regarding the direction of these states after their achievement.
The role of activism, both in this transitional period and in the constrained democracies that resulted, was evidently ambiguous. The substantial decline in state capacity and the redirection of external funding to non-governmental organisations strengthened some existing social movements with credible grassroots linkages, but simultaneously led to a proliferation of new NGOs, many owing their existence solely to the availability of donor funding and therefore accountable externally, rather than to those they claimed to speak for or represent.
'Civil society' was freed to act by political liberalisation, but simultaneously hampered in so doing by the deleterious effects of economic liberalisation.
Understanding activism since the 1990s
This dual transition to political and economic liberalisation-which was, it must be noted, incomplete or indeed reversed in a number of countries-had contradictory effects on African activism. In many places it opened up considerable space for societal activism: new constitutions provided legal freedoms of speech and assembly, even whilst these were sometimes disregarded by new governments brought to power by pro-democracy movements.
New independent newspapers and radio stations provided forums for the expression of It should however be evident that there is no activism that is authentically "of the people".
Research on activism must always have regard to tensions and conflicts, not only between particular movements, but also within them. Any study of a particular movement should analyse the relationship between a series of (usually unequal) actors: its leaders and officials; its paid employees (where relevant); those it seeks to directly represent and benefit; and those who are affected, directly or indirectly, by its activities. Unequal power relations -between the more and less educated, women and men, different ethnic groups, and between a dozen other potential divisions, have the potential to shape social movement discourse or activity. 38 Activist movements are not best understood as authentic and unproblematic movements of the people, easily contrasted to the powerful and exploitative in society. They are rather an expression of the contradictions and hierarchies of the society in which they operate, whose debates and conflicts express inequalities of resources and influence, education and influence, gender and ethnicity, amongst many others. This does not make them "inauthentic" 26 movements-rather, it makes them real articulations of political difference in societies marked by inequality and social conflict. The presumption of researchers should be to assume the existence of such tensions, hierarchies and inequalities, the better to enable analysis of the same.
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The This article has sought to summarise the complex experience of African activism over more than half-a-century. In so doing, it is itself unavoidably guilty not only of sweeping generalisation, but also imposing broad narratives of "struggle" onto movements with diverse aims, organisational forms, modes and methods of activism. Progressive western analysts of African political history have tended over the last fifty years to seek to identify particular social forces or movements that can form the basis of overarching, self-conscious projects of radical political transformation, usually of a preconceived kind. Africans have meanwhile gone about the difficult and often dangerous business of seeking to improve the particular circumstances of sections of their society, activities which at times coalesced into broader movements for social change that carried within them the potential for a radical transformation of society. Whilst western analysts and observers of Africa have commonly searched in vain for singular counter-hegemonic force that might address the continent's
